

Japanese Nuclear Energy after March 11, 2011 Journey to the Unknown: Encountering the Evitable under the Name of the Inevitable

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Prologue

I believe that it is inaccurate to describe the event in Fukushima as a “natural disaster.”

We, people from outside Japan, have only learned about the Fukushima situation from media reports which often portray the crisis as “inevitable.” I would like to elaborate on findings that the Fukushima Nuclear power plant disaster was, rather, “an avoidable situation,” a message echoed in the findings of Japan’s Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. In fact, the message from the Chairman of the Commission, Professor Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa, provides the best explanation for those who are not familiar with the issue.

“The earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 were natural disasters of a magnitude that shocked the entire world. Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant **cannot be regarded as a natural disaster**. It was a profoundly **manmade disaster** [*emphasis mine*] — that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response.

How could such an accident occur in Japan, a nation that takes such great pride in its global reputation for excellence in engineering and technology? This Commission believes the Japanese people — and the global community — deserve a full, honest and transparent answer to this question.”¹

This report was released on July 5, 2012, coincidentally, during my first week in Japan to conduct my research. Thus, the one question that I had wanted to study had already been investigated, ruled upon and the answers made official.

The Work of the 2012/2013 API Fellows

Normally, I would not automatically believe any official report. But after reading this 88-page summary report, and meeting two of its committee members (Katsuhiko Ishibashi, seismologist and professor emeritus of Kobe University and science journalist Mitsuhiko Tanaka), and listening to their arguments, I decided to adopt this report as my official explanation of the situation in Fukushima too.

My discussion will be about encountering the “evitable” and its aftermath. Since Fukushima is an ongoing issue, and there seems to be no end in sight, the information provided here will describe a particular time-frame that ends on September 11, 2013.

The myth of nuclear safety and low investment cost

It was about 20 years ago when nuclear vendors from Japan, Korea, Canada and the United States visited my former area of work, the Bangkok Post in Thailand. They wanted to talk to business journalists only, but I was invited to join because I had written many stories about non-transparency in the construction of nuclear research centers in Thailand, and about nuclear testing activities in the Pacific Ocean.

The vendors told my fellow business journalists that nuclear energy was cheap, and the return on investment was very high, as it used a small amount of uranium. They repeatedly showed us a small black object which they referred to as “uranium”, the size of which was only equivalent to that of a small 3.6 volt battery.

My fellow journalists appeared to be impressed with the information and looked at the small piece of “uranium” with admiration. However, I became

angry and emotional, and finally I asked whether the low cost of investment that they had boasted about included the cost of decommissioning plants and other related environmental costs, including the suffering of people mining the uranium, maintenance at nuclear power plants, health and other costs to workers and so on. The answer, which I remember very well, was “Yes”.

We had long and emotional arguments about the nature of the information they had provided and that I had described as “half-truth”. My fellow journalists felt irritated with my “impolite” behavior to “our guests.”

After staying for one year in Japan to follow the consequences of the nuclear disaster, reading news reports, interviewing concerned people, listening to the affected people in Fukushima, and observing many campaigns against nuclear power and energy in big cities, I became aware that a nuclear power plant not only burns “uranium,” it also burns “money”.

Struggles in the aftermath

Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology has estimated the cost of decontamination and cleanup (Fukushima) to be more than US\$50 billion. The central Japanese government has earmarked only \$11 billion in aid to the struggling region.²

The general public may think that all affected people will get compensation, but my investigation found many individuals who did not yet receive any recompense. “This is money from taxes of the Japanese: it is not the money of TEPCO,” said English teacher Mrs. Asami Kudo, who was my interpreter and informant.

Asami has moved to a relatively safe area, Inawashiro-machi, Fukushima, but her parents still live in the Ohnami district of Fukushima which is still exposed to low levels of radioactive contamination. They have refused to take compensation. Asami has also received no compensation, though she believes that she is entitled to it as a taxpayer.

Lawsuits have become a negotiation method used widely used by the affected people. Many are class action suits, while others are individual cases.

Asami has been consulting with a human rights lawyer to file charges against TEPCO. In a discussion with him in early September 2013, the lawyer insisted that if people did not appeal, TEPCO would assume that people in Fukushima were satisfied with only 120,000 Japanese yen (JPY).

The results of working within the legal system vary a good deal. One case filed by 15,000 affected people from Fukushima was dismissed at the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office. The office announced that it would not seek to indict any high-ranking government or TEPCO officials connected with the meltdown.³

An example of a successful case is that of a woman whose husband committed suicide after the incident. She filed a lawsuit asking TEPCO to pay compensation. The court ruled in favor of the dairy farmer’s wife.

A large number of cases are still in the process of mediation, outside the courts. One example is that of Mr. Anzai Toru and his 26 neighbors in Itate. His group originally filed a lawsuit at the Tokyo district court. However, to my knowledge, they then entered the process of settling the case outside court.⁴

Large numbers of court cases have been reported in news media. Lawsuits are often used as a last resort after all other alternative methods of dispute resolution have failed.

Though many relevant laws are in place, this does not guarantee that the Japanese people will be entitled to the provisions of the laws.

For example, there is the Compensation for Nuclear Damage Act (Act No. 147 of 1961) and the Indemnity Agreement for Compensation for Nuclear Damage Act No. 148, June 17, 1961. The Act no 148 was amended on April 17, 2009 and entered into force in January 2010. In addition to these, after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, a Special Measure Act of August 2011 was

introduced. The Nuclear Damage Compensation Facility Corporate Act was also introduced.⁵

There is also provision for compensation for lost salaries, mental anguish, business damage loss or reduced property value as a result of a disaster as well as loss of business due to “rumors” (for example around food contamination)⁶ Children under 18 years old and pregnant women living in affected areas are entitled to receive 400,000 JPY; those not considered as belonging to the afore-mentioned groups would get 80,000 JYP.

The laws are in place, but are not easy to get hold of. An organic farmer, Hiroshi Miura of Odaka, cannot do any farming on his 6.5-acre land as it is only 12 kilometers from the Fukushima power plant. So he purchased a new plot of land in Shinichi-machi town in Minami-soma city to do farming. He continues farming in Fukushima because he would like to encourage his fellow farmers to farm, and to reassure the public that the produce from Fukushima is safe. Mr. Miura has to fill up a 40-page compensation form. He said it is not easy for farmers to complete the form. “It is believed among us that this form is ‘to discourage’ us from filling up the form at all,” said Miura.⁷

Later, TEPCO adjusted the form, which could be seen on its website.

“While we have been processing permanent indemnification claims for afflicted persons for damages caused by the accident, due to the excessive volume of documentation, such as various application forms and instructions (the “Instructions”), we have received various comments and suggestions such as “they are hard to understand” and “the procedures are troublesome.”

Although originally prepared for the purpose of providing fair and smooth treatment, we apologize for the inconvenience and confusion that has arisen due to the complicated procedures.

In reflecting those comments and suggestions, we will improve the indemnification procedures by distributing a simple supplemental reference form titled, “Easy Claim Instructions” and enhancing our support system to help facilitate the claims.”⁸

For Asami and her family, it is the payment criteria and systems that are unclear. After 30 months, Asami has received only 30,000 JYP which was donation money from the general public in Date City.

I will therefore elaborate the case of Asami for this study so that we may start to see one reality around the disagreements and the process of negotiations.

During the peak of the nuclear plume, Asami was pregnant. In the midst of the confusion, anxiety and many other matters erupting in her life all of a sudden, she had a miscarriage. She has not received any compensation for this.

Asami told me many times that her story is one-sided, as it is just her account. However, I can say that her struggle with “invisible enemies” is not a standalone case. I read of many similar struggles in news reports, and I learned of them while interviewing other affected people and concerned people. But those stories were not first-hand. And some of stories of others I had interviewed myself were not comprehensive enough.

I had been in close and frequent contact with Asami since early December 2012. I stayed with her family and went around Fukushima with her until the last week of June, 2013. Moreover, Asami agreed to check the accuracy of this writing to ensure that the information she provided to me was not de-contextualized.

Since the beginning of April 2011, Asami had been contacting a chief of the Disaster Preparedness Department of Date city about the level of radiation in her area, which was measured by Fukushima University. The official (whose name was given to me, but I would like to withhold third parties’

names throughout this paper) replied, “The university measured it in a wrong way.”

Asami started petitioning the government when she found that there was no action taken to redress the problems in her areas. Three months after the incident she measured radiation levels at her house in Oguni, which she had purchased four months before the disaster. It was 3.40 to 4.07 microsievert/hour at 100 centimeter height. However 3.8 is the standard used to set up an evacuation zone in Oguni district. The government agency asked her to contract Date City officials. When she contacted the Date city office, an official asked her to contact the central government. Instead of addressing the problem, the Date City official explained that because her house was located next to a small mountain, the area was accidentally contaminated by topographical factors and therefore was not considered an evacuation zone.

The buck has been passed around, sometimes from the central government to municipalities, from the municipalities to the prefecture level to the central government level to the city and back to the residents. This has caused many affected people, including Asami, great agony.

On July 25, 2011, the residents of Oguni chartered three buses to Tokyo to petition at the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and TEPCO. The petitions were about setting an evacuation zone for a whole district, not house by house.

On July 28, Asami’s husband attended a session called “Negotiation with the government” organized by Mr. Mizuho Fukushima who was a member of the House of Councilors (a local administrative body) with Friends of the Earth—Japan and another local organization).

The message from that meeting was that the town was completely safe as the area only showed an average of 20 milisievert (mSv) compared to the “standard of 100 mSv/per year.”

Asami knew too well that the standard level was set by International Commission and Radiological

Protection (ICRP), and the standard of 100 mSv/per year should only be used in emergency exposure situations. When an argument about this information arose, it brought about a new argument with Fukushima prefecture officials that “Fukushima is under an emergency exposure situation, and Date city has already adopted the lowest level of exposure.”

Perhaps to show that it had done something, Date City selected the case of an elderly man, Mr. Morio Oonami, who lives with his son and young grandchildren in Oguni, as an example of an recommended evacuation house. But Asami said, “The whole area was being ignored again.”

Since the disaster, Asami and her neighbors have encountered a number of disputes. Due to space limitations, I will now only raise just one more crucial issue: how and when to decontaminate the areas.

Asami’s parents live in Fukushima’s Ohnami village, which is at the border between Date City and Fukushima City. The Koike family (Asami’s parents)’s organic farm has been affected by the nuclear fallout. The family had to stop farming after the disaster due to the high level of radioactivity on their farmland, which contained over 10,000 bq/kg of radiation. Some plants still contain radiation beyond the food safety limit (100bq/kg).

Before decontamination could be implemented, there were a number of negotiations on topics such as how to decontaminate areas surrounding a house; how to clean the roof, the floor, and the yard; how much soil surface should be removed; and where to keep the contaminated materials. Ohnami became the first village in Fukushima where decontamination started in residential areas, in November 2012.

After the decontamination, the question was where to store the removed items. After a number of negotiations and dialogues between local residents, officials and concerned agencies, it was agreed to use the children’s playground as a temporary storage

facility. By June, 2013, that place was bursting at the seams, full of plastic bags containing contaminated materials. Despite this, I saw farmers continuing growing rice and vegetables just below the open yard space.

Then I heard a story from a farmer (name withheld) that he went to sell his rice at a Japan Agriculture (JA) office in Fukushima (place withheld), but his rice was contaminated at 700 bq/kg. The JA agreed to buy his rice even though the level of contamination was beyond the safety standard 100 bq/kg. Perhaps, that was to help the farmer to earn some income. The farmer said the officer said it was OK, as they could mix it with rice that was not contaminated. Thus, the average would be fine.

Upon learning about this information, I asked Asami to verify it with the JA office. The answer was that it was “not true”. Asami apologized to me, but I was certain that she had translated the messages from both sides correctly, and we had the duty to verify and it was their duty to deny. I told Asami a similar story of when I interviewed two fishermen in Watari (Miyagi) in September 2012. They told me that when they caught some fish, they sent the record of their catch to TEPCO through a local fishing cooperative, and then released the fish into the sea as TEPCO would pay for the amount that they caught each day. I asked my interpreter (not Asami) to verify this with TEPCO. TEPCO denied it. Even when a pastor and two fishermen said the same thing, the official denied it. The fisherman said even he would not eat the fish they caught and would not give any to their loved ones. In fact, when I interviewed the fishermen, they were mending their nets. This indicates that there was still fishing activity in the area. They even invited me to join them on their fishing trips.

There were a lot of cries and tears during the requests for decontaminations. I saw Mrs. Haga (not her real name), one of my host families, cry her heart out when she learned that her area did not receive priority for decontamination from the Date city office. Haga had been using different means to gain her rights to live in a good

environment. She joined big demonstrations in Tokyo, went to petition many concerned agencies and used many non-violent methods to protest in front of many concerned ministries in Tokyo.

Haga is a friend of Asami’s parents. They share a passion; studying the Chernobyl case. They were also well aware of the adverse impacts of nuclear energy before the Chernobyl accident. Haga, Asami and her parents showed me many documents that they had been studying well before the Chernobyl 1986 accident.

But the indifference of the government is sometimes effective in discouraging people. The latest message I got from Haga was; “We want to stop shouting and protesting.”

However, for Haga, Asami’s parents and a number of farmers in Fukushima who I interviewed, one of the lessons learned is the nuclear power plants should not be constructed. “I am so sorry that I did not try harder to stop it, and later, after I could not stop it, that I worked as a telephone operator at the power plant,” said Mrs. Nemoto from Odaka town.⁹

An additional dispute is about where to evacuate to. It was apparent that the affected people who have moved to areas outside the Fukushima prefecture are entitled to compensation. However, those who have evacuated to an area within Fukushima prefecture will not get compensation.¹⁰ Asami works in Fukushima, so she could not move to another prefecture. She has to fight to get assistance for rental costs.

Asami and eight other people joined as a group asking for the right to evacuate within Fukushima. The group invited a Mainichi reporter to the meeting. A dialogue was held in mid April 2012.

She also organized dialogues with officials and human right lawyers. She found that it is hard to organize people. Many of those who joined had some fear that it would affect their work. Or their enthusiasm died down soon after getting no response.

Health is one of the most controversial issues.

In early October 2012, I came across a leaflet from the Friday No Nuke campaign in Fukushima. The message was about the protesters' negative attitudes towards a Dr. Yamashita, who had said there was no relation between cancer and nuclear accidents.

On many levels, the Fukushima incident has uncovered poor medical ethics. Some doctors from Fukushima University said that they could detect small cysts, because they had good machines which could detect even very small cysts. They told residents not to worry about staying in Fukushima as it was safe, and there would be no significant effects.

Apart from attacking these doctors in social media, many protesters dressed themselves up as medical doctors carrying banners protesting against medical personnel who sided with the government and TEPCO.

Dr. Yamashita was a professor at Nagasaki University. He has also studied the impacts of Chernobyl. He was invited to Fukushima Medical University by the Fukushima Governor Yuhei Sato after the March 2011 disaster to serve as a radiation risk management adviser to the prefecture.

In that role, Dr. Yamashita has made many notorious claims. For example, as could be heard in many of his lectures in Fukushima, he stated that a radiation exposure of 100mSv/year is safe. He told the affected people in Fukushima that if they smile, radiation will not hurt them, and that the people of Fukushima should be proud that they will even be more famous than the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹¹

For many locals in Fukushima, Dr. Yamashita has been assisting the government in downplaying the danger of radiation fallout. On March, 2013, the Fukushima Medical University conducted research screenings the thyroids of children below 18 years old. Out of 38,114 children tested so far, 13,766 or 36.1 percent had either nodules or cysts. Of

these, 186 required second-stage examination and three were found to have thyroid cancer. However in June, 2013 different newspapers reported that 12 youths had developed thyroid cancer.¹² This issue needs close monitoring.

According to Australian pediatrician Dr. Helen Caldicott, all nodules and cysts in children should be immediately biopsied to rule out malignancy, instead of waiting to be followed up in two years. She also stated that an early appearance of thyroid abnormalities, in less than one year, meant the children received a very high dose of radiation.¹³

However, Dr. Yamashita who is the head of this research team, wrote a letter to the Japanese Thyroid Medical Association to prevent other doctors from providing second opinions and advice for people shown abnormalities through screening. His message was contained in this letter:

“In the first-stage ultrasound examination, we have defined what needs the second-stage examination as nodules over 5.1 mm and cysts (non-solid but colloidal or liquid collection only) over 20.1 mm. Thus, in addition to those with no abnormal findings, those with nodules smaller than 5 mm or cysts smaller than 20 mm have been decided not to be the subjects of further testing such as biopsies, or treatments. We would imagine that you might receive a few inquiries or consultations from parents regarding these results. Please explain to them well to make sure they understand that any further testing is not necessary before the next examination unless symptoms appear.”¹⁴

The disaster has allowed many Fukushima people to see a different side of a world they had never before questioned. In December 2012, a large group of people protested against the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is being viewed widely as a nuclear energy supporter, rather than a regulatory agency.¹⁵

Chinese media reported on the issue in a report entitled “IAEA conference not welcome in Fukushima.” The report reveals the distrust of Fukushima people towards the Japanese government and the IAEA. They believed that the IAEA supported the mishandling of the crisis in Fukushima.¹⁶

The power of oversight organizations has been associated with the history of the “peaceful use of nuclear power” in Japan. After studying various disputes, confusions, propaganda and negotiations, I can say that not all nuclear power plants have been constructed without resistance.. But due to political and economic influence at the local, national and international levels, to date, there are 54 nuclear reactors in Japan.¹⁷

Negotiation by the business sector is often more influential than the noise of street protests. For example, the president of the *Keidanren* or Japan Business Federation organized a press conference demanding the restarting of nuclear power plants.¹⁸ Such demand from the business sector could easily receive a response from the governments, especially the current ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

“In vocally and repeatedly backing reactor restarts, Abe is exerting political pressure on the new nuclear watchdog agency, the Nuclear Regulation Authority, to facilitate his agenda. During the 2013 Upper House election campaign policy debate, the LDP was the only party to oppose phasing out nuclear energy and sees its solitary position as a badge of responsibility; but on this issue principles owe much to financial interests.”¹⁹

Meanwhile, every Friday in many big cities around Japan, people from all walks of life join hands protesting against the restarting of nuclear power plants as well as asking people to protect young children from being exposed to radiation. I observed the Anti-Nuclear demonstration in Sendai and Tokyo very often, but just a few times in Fukushima and twice in Matsuyama, and once in Fukuoka.

In Sendai, some of the participants are activists and those who had once protested against the nuclear power plant construction in Onagawa. But many are just concerned mothers. During the winter, these mothers could not carry their young children to protest sites due to the snow and the low temperature, but they organized small group discussions. It was an educational forum in which all participants contributed their own funds to organize and study issues concerning nuclear energy.

In Tokyo, the protesters come from all walks of life and many came from nearby cities such as Yokohama and Kamakura. Many are activists and a large number are simply members of the general public. Early in 2013, I could still see many people who braved the rain and snow to the Tokyo protest sites. The numbers increased when the weather became warmer. During March 9 to 10 and early June, 2013, the number of participants was 50 times the normal “Friday Demo” but this figure cannot be compared with the big rally against the restart of the Ohi nuclear power plant on July 16, 2012.

The number of people who joined the regular “Friday Demo” was not large. However, these people are convinced that Japan should reconsider its nuclear energy policy and the government should listen to their voices. “If we, the minority are still making noise, the government has to take our voices into consideration,” said a man who has been protesting against nuclear energy and the restart of nuclear power plants since 2011. He also works as a volunteer for the homeless.

The resistance continued even though some were being charged with occupying public space in front of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in Tokyo’s Kasumigaseki district in May 2013. I interviewed a number of people who had participated in the “Demo” and many people who kept vigil at the tent. They said there was “no political change, but social values have been changing. Politicians only want to lean on power, and they don’t want to change.”

For many participants in the “Demo,” the protest is a means of resistance and a means to communicate with the authorities. Even if it could not change the policy of the nuclear immediately or directly, it has a momentum, because of which the government cannot easily restart nuclear power plants that were shut down for safety inspections after the March 11 incidents.

Mr. Shiro Ninomiya, an anti-nuclear power activist in Tokyo, does not think the “Demo” directly contributes to any political change. He has cautioned that the protest is not organized by any specific organization, and the movement has been spreading to other areas over Japan.

“It is encouraging people to act by themselves, and will lead the status of democracy in Japan one step ahead,” he said, adding that it could indirectly change the political situation, but this would take a long time.

However, the LDP, which is advocating nuclear power, won landslide elections in both houses in 2012 and 2013. Certainly, the protestors on streets are not the majority. Mr. Ninomiya pointed out that the majority of Japanese may have sympathy towards the protesters, but their votes are driven by something else.

The Abenomic policies and nationalistic stand of the LDP may have contributed to its victories. Moreover, the Japanese media have been reporting about people who complain about the high cost of electricity, which is echoed by the industrial sector, including power generation companies that have to shoulder the “higher cost” of “fossil” fuel.

However, there is no mention about the “priceless cost” of using nuclear energy and the cost of decontamination, and other environmental and mental costs of affected people who cannot return “home”.

From conference rooms to streets protest, I witnessed the tears of many affected people. One man made me sad on one protests, as he shouted,

“I have a house, I used to have a house...” His voice was raised, and the tears rolled down.

When Tokyo was awarded as the city of the next Olympic Games, Mrs. Kyoko Okazaki, a mother of three children, wrote me an email message saying that she is happy that Tokyo is being awarded as the host of the Games. “But I do not want the public to forget about Fukushima people who still suffer and live in temporary housing.”

The negotiations will go on and on.

The journey to the unknown

The way to deal with the Fukushima Daiichi disaster is unknown to all of us, including PM Abe who, two weeks after ensuring the Olympic committee that the situation was under control, told a meeting of international scientists in Kyoto that “Our country needs your knowledge and expertise...”²⁰

More social and political consequences will unfold: more contaminated water leaks, more lies, more cover-ups, and more money will be spent on decontaminating areas, forest, waterways and so on. Surely now, more money will be spent on sport complexes for the Olympics, but will there be a clear policy to address the myriad problems in Fukushima?

Conclusion

To prevent the magnitude contestations and endless negotiations, “truth” consultations must be initiated before any decision is made to construct more nuclear power plants. A truth consultation is a consultation without the intervention of nuclear advocates. Economic incentives and subsidies should not be provided for nuclear operators. Nuclear safety should be demystified.

NOTES

¹The National Diet of Japan: The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, the Executive summary, page 9

²The Diplomat blogs, July 25, 2013: thediplomat.com/pacific-money/2013/07/25/fukushima-decontamination-and-cleanup-will-cost-50-billion/

³Asahi Shimbun, September 10, 2013; ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201309100060

⁴Interviewed on November 8, 2012, and June 25, 2013.

⁵Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Japan's Compensation System for Nuclear Damage, 2012.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Interviewed on November 12, 2012.

⁸TEPCO, October 11, 2011; www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/index2-e.html

⁹Interviewed on October 12, 2012 .

¹⁰This dispute has not been reported in English media worldwide.

¹¹www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOgaBUDFeb4

¹²Concluded from the report of the Japan Press Daily Press, June 5, 2013: japandailynews.com/fukushima-thyroid-cancer-cases-rise-to-12-confirmed-15-suspected-0530049

¹³Compiled from different material and from "36 Percent Of Fukushima Kids Have Abnormal Thyroid Growths And Doctors Are In The Dark": www.businessinsider.com/fukushima-children-have-abnormal-thyroid-growths-2012-7

¹⁴fukushimavoice-eng.blogspot.jp/2012/05/fukushima-childrens-thyroid-examination.html

¹⁵www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofowgz-HcAo

¹⁶www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVvFmlk8bN0

¹⁷Concluded from Aldrich, Daniel P 2008. "Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West," Cornell University Press

¹⁸www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/10/27/business/keidan-ren-urges-dpj-to-promptly-restart-nuclear-plants

¹⁹Jeff Kingston, "Abe's Nuclear Energy Policy and Japan's Future," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 34, No. 1, August 19, 2013. - See more at: www.japanfocus.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3986#sthash.Gb5YOORG.dpuf

²⁰USA TODAY, October 8, 2013: Japan PM seeks help on Fukushima leak; www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/06/japan-pm-seeks-overseas-help-on-fukushima-leak/2930855